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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT  
__________________ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner 
v. 
MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
 
Respondent is incarcerated 
 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Mr. Lujan was convicted of aggravated robbery after an eyewitness 
identified him at a suggestive show-up and pointed to him in court.  The court of 
appeals reversed the conviction due to the suggestive nature of the show-up and 
the poor conditions under which the eyewitness viewed the robber during the 
crime. 
 The State argues that, although there was suggestive State action when the 
police conducted the show-up of a handcuffed Mr. Lujan, this Court should hold 
that suggestive State action is step one of a two-step inquiry instead of one of the 
conditions under a totality of the circumstances approach.  The State next argues 
that this Court should decline to set a standard necessary decide prejudice in this 
case.   
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 This Court should do the inverse: it should decline to decide whether 
suggestive State action is a threshold inquiry where it is undisputed suggestive 
State action was present.  And it should hold that the State has the burden to 
prove that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ decision, which correctly 
analyzed the totality of the circumstances and held that the eyewitness 
identification was inadmissible and that its admission was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This Court has jurisdiction after granting the State’s writ of certiorari 
under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(5).  The court of appeals opinion is attached 
as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues: 
1. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the district court’s denial of Respondent’s motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony.” 
2. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
the State was required to demonstrate that any error in admission of the 
eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
whether it erred in concluding the admission of that testimony was not 
harmless.” 
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The Court’s order granting certiorari is attached as Addendum B.   
On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the court of appeals for 
correctness.  State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 15, 144 P.3d 1096.  Whether 
eyewitness identification violates the right to due process is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness.  See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 22, 48 P.3d 
953. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The exclusion of an unreliable eyewitness identification is grounded in the 
due process clause of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 The State charged Mr. Lujan with aggravated robbery after a show-up 
procedure.  R:1-2.  The eyewitness was subsequently unable to positively identify 
a suspect at a lineup.  State’s Ex. 42.  But he later identified Mr. Lujan at the 
preliminary hearing.  R:355:5.  Mr. Lujan filed a motion to suppress 
identifications by the eyewitness, which the court denied.  R:54; 356:75-76.  At 
trial, the jury found Mr. Lujan guilty and the court sentenced him to a suspended 
prison sentence of 5 years to live, with 36 months of probation and 395 days of 
jail.  R:337.  He was released to ICE for deportation.  R:337. 
 The court of appeals reversed.  State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 1, 357 
P.3d 20.  It held that the introduction of the eyewitness identification was 
erroneous and prejudicial.  This Court granted certiorari review. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 On the date of the charged offenses, a stranger approached the eyewitness 
as he prepared his car for inspection in the predawn hours.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 
199, ¶ 2;  R:355:9.  The car’s headlights were on and a working streetlamp was 
twenty yards away.  R:355:10, 11.  The eyewitness said that a porch light mounted 
twenty feet away from the car, the car’s dome light, and the illumination from the 
instrument panel also provided some light.  R:355:11, 15, 17, 24.    
 The stranger opened the rear driver’s side door and then closed it and 
opened the driver’s door.  Id. ¶ 3; R:355:4-5, 15-17.  At first, the man was standing 
about a foot away from where the eyewitness was seated in the driver’s seat.  
R:355:17-18.  The man crouched down with his face eight to nine inches from the 
eyewitness’s for “five, seven seconds.”  R:355:20.  The man said to the eyewitness, 
“why you following me?”  Id.; R:355:5.  The man then put his hand near his waist 
and the eyewitness believed the man was reaching for the handle of a gun or a 
knife.  Id.; R:355:22.  The eyewitness was afraid he might be stabbed or shot.  Id.; 
R:355:32. 
 The eyewitness was able to work his way out of the car, move around the 
man, walk sideways to the front of the car, and then “bolt” to the back door.  Id.; 
R:355:7, 31.  The eyewitness watched the man drive off in the car and alerted the 
police.  Id.; R:355:32-33. 
 The eyewitness provided a description to the police.  R:355:34.  He also 
testified at the preliminary hearing about his memory of the man.  He said the 
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man was Spanish.  Id. ¶ 2; R:355:34 (Q. What about the race of the man?  Can 
you tell us anything about that? A. I would have to say he’s Spanish, yeah.).  He 
was wearing a black leather jacket that had either buttons or a zipper but was 
open during the encounter.  Id.; R:355:20-21.  He had on a black beanie.  Id.; 
R:355:25.  The eyewitness explained that the man’s “longish hair” poked out of 
the beanie to “mid-ear length.”  Id.; R:355:26.  The man’s hair was straight and 
its color was a combination of black and white.  Id.; R:355:27.  The eyewitness 
“definitely” remembered the man’s hair.  Id.; R:355:27-28.   
The police apprehended Mr. Lujan inside an air conditioning unit at a 
nearby school after following a trail of leaking car fluid and employing a K9 
officer.  Id. ¶ 4; R:350:46-47.  Mr. Lujan told the testifying officer “something like 
somebody is following me, somebody is out to get me.”  Id.; R:359:8.  Mr. Lujan 
explained that he had been at the nearby 7-11 convenience store.  R:359:8.  He 
then walked to the place where he was found.  R:359:8.  A search of the area from 
the air conditioning unit, the vehicle, and the trail back to 7-11 revealed no 
weapons.  R:359:24.  Mr. Lujan was searched at the time of his arrest and no 
weapons were recovered.  R:359:46.  However, when he was booked into jail, an 
officer listed a knife among Mr. Lujan’s possessions but did not remember what it 
looked like.  R:359:94, 99.   
The police brought the eyewitness to Mr. Lujan’s location and informed 
him that they had a suspect and wanted to see if the eyewitness could identify 
him.  Id. ¶ 6; R:355:36.  They conducted a show-up procedure in the dark, 
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illuminating Mr. Lujan with police car headlights.  Id.; R:355:37.  Mr. Lujan was 
the only person at the show-up who was not a police officer.  Id.; R:355:36-37.  
He stood with his hands cuffed while the eyewitness looked at him from the seat 
of a police car.  Id.; R:355:38, 55; 357:49.  The police put a beanie on his head.  
R:357:94.  The eyewitness identified Mr. Lujan as the man who took his car.  Id.; 
R:355:8. 
Mr. Lujan filed a motion requesting a lineup, which the court granted.  Id. 
¶ 7; R:18-25.  At the lineup, the eyewitness was told that if he recognized any 
person present in the lineup as the individual involved in the crime, he was to 
mark that person’s number in a square.  Id.; State’s Ex. 42.  The eyewitness was 
unable to positively identify anyone and left the square blank.  Id.; State’s Ex. 42.  
The eyewitness was also told that if he thought he recognized any person 
participating in the lineup, he should mark their number on the back of the card.  
State’s Ex. 42.  The eyewitness marked two people from the lineup on the back of 
the card: Mr. Lujan and another man.  Id.; State’s Ex. 42. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked the eyewitness to point 
to the man who had robbed him.  Id. ¶ 8.  The eyewitness pointed to Mr. Lujan.  
Id.; R:355:6.  After the preliminary hearing, Mr. Lujan moved to exclude evidence 
of in-court identification as well as evidence that the eyewitness identified Mr. 
Lujan in the show-up.  The court denied the motion and permitted the eyewitness 
to identify Mr. Lujan at trial as the man who robbed him.  R:356:75-76; 357:20. 
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At trial, the defense called a correctional officer at the jail, who testified 
that he was responsible for clothing storage at the jail.  The inventory showed 
that Mr. Lujan did not have a leather jacket when he was booked into jail; the 
officer was not aware of items ever being misplaced.  Id. ¶ 5; R:359:62-69, 75.  
The defense also called an expert to testify about the reliability of eyewitness 
identification.  R:358. 
Mr. Lujan was convicted and the court of appeals reversed.  Id. ¶ 1.  After 
applying the state due process standard and comparing the case to State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the court held that “[t]he same factors that 
led the Supreme Court to conclude that Ramirez was ‘an extremely close case’ are 
present here” along with “additional indications of unreliability” — the 
eyewitness remembered a robber with long hair, the eyewitness did not identify 
Mr. Lujan at a lineup where conditions were less suggestive than the show-up, 
and the cross-racial identification factors were more significant than they were in 
Ramirez.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶ 13-14 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784).  
The court of appeals was “confident that here we can ‘say that [the] testimony is 
legally insufficient when considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant 
a preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility.”  Id. ¶ 15 
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784).  Because the error was not harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the court vacated Mr. Lujan’s conviction and remanded for a 
new trial.  Id. ¶ 19. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The court of appeals was correct in its application of precedent and its 
holding.  The court of appeals properly analyzed the reliability considerations 
outlined in Ramirez.  This Court should affirm the holding that the eyewitness 
identification in this case was unreliable and inadmissible because it was 
suggestive, inconsistent, and brief.  
This case does not present the issue of whether suggestive government 
conduct is a threshold inquiry or a factor to be considered under the totality of 
the circumstances.  This Court should address that issue when a case presents it.  
It is undisputed that suggestive government conduct occurred in this case.  But if 
this Court does elect to provide guidance, it should hold that the suggestive 
circumstances surrounding the lineup constitute one factor in a totality of the 
circumstances analysis geared towards reliability.   
 The admission of the eyewitness identification was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Identification was the only matter at issue and the State relied 
on both the show-up and an in-court identification at trial.  Mr. Lujan denied 
involvement.  There was no fingerprint or DNA evidence.  The eyewitness 
remembered a jacket and a weapon, but neither was entered into evidence.  The 
eyewitness’s description of a long-haired man did not match Mr. Lujan and the 
eyewitness did not positively identify Mr. Lujan at a lineup where blatant 
suggestive circumstances were absent.  This Court should affirm. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The court of appeals did not err in its application of the reliability 
analysis. 
 
The court of appeals applied this Court’s precedent to the facts of the case 
and arrived at the correct holding.    “In Ramirez, the Court set forth five factors 
that must be considered when analyzing the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification.”  State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d 20 (citing State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991)).  The “pertinent factors” originally 
outlined in Long are: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or 
her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness’s 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last 
area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and 
whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer’s. 
 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 493 (Utah 1986)).  The list is “not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors 
that may be considered.”  State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27, 48 P.3d 953.  
Consideration of all these factors and the totality of the circumstances in Mr. 
Lujan’s case led the court of appeals to the correct conclusion that the eyewitness 
testimony was legally insufficient to “warrant a preliminary finding of reliability 
and, therefore, admissibility.”  See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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A. The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event. 
The first reliability factor analyzes the witness’s opportunity to view the 
actor.  “[P]ertinent circumstances include the length of time the witness viewed 
the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness 
could view the actor’s face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were 
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other circumstances 
affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe the actor.”  Id. at 782.  In Mr. 
Lujan’s case, the eyewitness had a brief period of seconds to view the robber, who 
was a stranger to him.  The eyewitness testified that at first he saw the man for 
five to seven seconds when the man’s face was eight to nine inches away.  
R:355:20.  The man then placed his hand near his waistband, grabbing what the 
witness believed to be a weapon.  R:355:6.  The eyewitness then extricated 
himself from the car and “bolted” to his house.  R:355:7.  It took him eight to nine 
seconds to scoot out of the driver’s seat and past the man.  R:355:229.  This 
sequence of events left only a short window, consistently described in seconds, 
during which the eyewitness had the opportunity to view the robber.   
The incident occurred at night.  The car’s headlights were on and a 
streetlamp was twenty yards away.  R:355:10, 11.  The eyewitness said that a 
porch light mounted twenty feet away from the car, the car’s dome light, and the 
illumination from the instrument panel also provided some light.  R:355:11, 15, 
17, 24.  Other circumstances affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe the 
actor included a focus on what the eyewitness believed to be a weapon instead of 
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the robber’s features and the stress of the robbery, which left the witness 
“distraught” and worried he would be stabbed or shot.  R:355:32, 35.   
The State argues that there was no “evidence of ‘weapon–focus effect’ that 
tends to decrease the reliability of the eyewitness identification” because “no 
weapon was ever produced.”  State’s Brief (SB) SB 45.  But the effect is the result 
of “draw[ing] visual attention away from other things such as the culprit’s face.”  
Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 
277, 282 (2003).  Participants in studies tend to make “more errors when a 
weapon was inferred or present.”  National Research Council of the National 
Academies, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 96 
(2014).  The eyewitness in this case testified that the man’s hand was “gripping 
around” what “looked like a handle” that was about “five inches” long and his 
hand was “actually touching the object that was sticking out . . . of his waistband.”  
R:355:22-23.  It is likely more distracting to see one portion of a concealed 
weapon in anticipation of seeing the rest than to see a weapon that is already in 
the open.  Therefore, the first Ramirez consideration counsels against admitting 
the eyewitness identification from the show-up. 
B. The witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event. 
As noted above, the eyewitness was focusing on the robber’s hand, which 
the witness believed was placed on a weapon.  R:355:6.  The eyewitness’s first 
glimpse of the robber’s face for a period of seconds would have been startling, 
and afterward the eyewitness’s focus was directed at a possible weapon and a 
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path back to the house.  Although the State argues that the eyewitness was not 
unduly stressed because he at first “thought the robber might want a drink or a 
ride,” SB 46, studies have indicated that witnesses, even when they have 
“significant opportunity to view the culprit,” are less accurate at identifying a 
suspect when they “have had little reason to attend closely” because they are not 
aware that a stolen item was valuable or that a crime was committed.  Wells & 
Olson, supra, at 282. 
The State points out that, by the time the eyewitness was sitting in “the 
safety and anonymity of the police cruiser,” his anxiety was likely “sooth[ed].”  SB 
36.  But the “effects of suggestion may be particularly important when the 
original memory is of a highly stressful event.” National Research Council of the 
National Academies, supra, at 95 (emphasis added).  In a study that looked at 
military personnel participating in mock POW scenarios, the “study found that 
misinformative details of the interrogation event (e.g., regarding the identity of 
the interrogator), which were introduced after the event had been encoded into 
long-term memory, affected identification accuracy.  The study also found that 
memories acquired during stressful events are highly vulnerable to modification 
by exposure to post-event misinformation, even in individuals whose level of 
training and experience might be considered relatively immune to such 
influences.” Id. (citing C.A. Morgan III et al., Misinformation Can Influence 
Memory For Recently Experienced, Highly Stressful Events, Int’l J.L. & 
Psychiatry, 36(1) (2013)). 
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The State also argues that the robber remained facing the eyewitness 
“without a disguise.”  SB 44.  But in a study where “[i]n half the robberies, the 
robber wore a knit pullover cap that covered his hair and hairline” and in the 
other half, “he did not wear a hat,” the “robber was less accurately identified 
when he was disguised: 45% of the participants identified the robber in the lineup 
test if he wore no hat during the robbery; only 27% identified him if he wore a hat 
during the robbery.”  Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steve D. Penrod, 
Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. 
Int. 54 (2006).  The eyewitness in this case stated the robber wore a black beanie.  
R:355:25. 
C. The witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his physical and 
mental acuity. 
The third factor is the witness’s capacity to observe the event.  “Here, 
relevant circumstances include whether the witness’s capacity to observe was 
impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal 
motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, 
injury, drugs, or alcohol.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.  “Contrary to much accepted 
lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual 
abilities are known to decrease significantly.”  Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89.  The 
eyewitness in this case acknowledged the frightening and threatening nature of 
the robbery, which left him “distraught.”  R:355:35.  The eyewitness testified that 
during his encounter with the robber, he was afraid he might be stabbed or shot.  
R:355:32.  Additionally, fatigue was likely a factor because the incident occurred 
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at night when the eyewitness was awake because he had been unable to sleep.  
R:355:14. 
D. Whether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion. 
Relevant considerations under this reliability factor include the length of 
time between the incident and the identification, “instances when the witness . . . 
failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses 
gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the 
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.  A show-up is most reliable when the 
eyewitness was already familiar with the suspect.  E.g., State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 
760, 763 (Utah 1984).  In State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ¶¶ 5, 18-19, 20 P.3d 265, 
the Court considered it a “close question” whether the reliability factors pointed 
to admissibility when two suspects were presented at a show-up and the victim 
ruled out one and was confident the other was the robber.  The eyewitness in this 
case had never seen the man who robbed him before and did not know Mr. Lujan.  
R:355:5.  The time between the incident and the initial identification was about 
thirty-five minutes.  R:355:8.   
The identification was made under circumstances similar to the show-up in 
Ramirez, which troubled the court because of its “blatant suggestiveness.”  
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.  As the court of appeals put it, “[t]he same factors that 
led the Supreme Court to conclude that Ramirez was ‘an extremely close case’ are 
 
 
15 
 
present here.”  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 13.  As in Ramirez, the show-up was 
conducted at night and the defendant was illuminated by police car headlights.  
817 P.2d at 784; R:355:37.  The defendant was the only person at the show-up 
who was not a police officer.  Id.; R:355:36-37.  “He stood with his hands cuffed” 
while the eyewitness looked at him from the seat of a police car.  Id.; R:355:38, 
55; R:357:49.  Additionally, in both cases the police notified the eyewitness before 
the identification that the defendant was their suspect in the case.  Id.; R:355:35; 
see Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, supra, at 286 (“the ratio of accurate to 
inaccurate identifications is strongly affected by whether or not eyewitnesses 
have been instructed (warned) prior to viewing the lineup that the culprit might 
or might not be in the lineup.”).   
Furthermore, the eyewitness provided a description that did not match Mr. 
Lujan and the witness was unable to identify Mr. Lujan with certainty when he 
was not the only possible suspect.  The eyewitness consistently described the 
robber as having “longish hair” that poked out of the beanie to “mid-ear length.”  
R:355:26.  The eyewitness “definitely” remembered the man’s hair.  R:355:27-28.  
Mr. Lujan’s head was shaved when he was apprehended and when the eyewitness 
identified him at the show-up.  State’s Ex. 43 (booking photo); R:78 (booking 
photo attached as an exhibit to the motion to exclude eyewitness identification).   
Additionally, as the court of appeals noted, “the man’s original description 
of the robber omitted any mention of facial hair,” which is a “feature[] that 
seem[s] hard to miss at a distance of ten inches.”  Lujan, 2015 UT App, ¶ 14.  The 
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State writes without record citation that “Officer Bias admitted cutting short his 
initial investigation with [the witness] to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen 
car, suggesting [the witness] may not have gotten to that part of his identification 
and did not need to revisit it once Defendant was arrested.”  SB 41.  The officer 
testified that he spoke with the eyewitness, who provided a description.  
R:357:117-18.  The officer then “handed him a witness statement” and asked him 
to complete it while the officer “began just checking the area visually to see if 
there was anything that was dropped,” which is when he noticed the leak.  
R:357:119.  He did not testify that his interview was interrupted before the 
witness had provided a complete description of the robber.  Similarly, the witness 
testified the officer found the leak “[a]fter I gave a description.”  R:357:45. 
The State also argues that “the inconsistencies in [the eyewitness’s] 
descriptions of the robber — the hair, the jacket, and the goatee — were 
reasonably explained.  Through Defendant’s expert, the prosecutor established 
that lighting and proximity both obscure or distort things.” SB 37.  The poor 
witnessing conditions do not mitigate the inconsistencies in the witness’s 
description or his failure to make a positive identification absent suggestive 
circumstances; rather, the poor witnessing conditions and inconsistencies are 
both factors indicating the identification was not reliable and both weigh heavily 
in favor of excluding it.  
Even after seeing Mr. Lujan at the show-up, at a lineup procedure, which 
lacks many of the highly suggestive circumstances that make a show-up 
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troubling, the witness understood the instructions but did not positively identify 
Mr. Lujan.  R:355:39-40.  Rather, he identified two men he thought looked 
familiar.  R:355:40-41.  Long noted that identifications in a group procedure are 
more reliable than show-up procedures like the ones in Ramirez and in this case.  
Long, 721 P.2d at 495 n.8.  The identification in this case was not spontaneous, 
did not remain consistent, and was the product of suggestion. 
The State argues that the “variables subject to consideration under” the 
suggestiveness factor “are usefully divided into two categories: (a) the 
circumstances of the identification procedure itself that may be suggestive 
(procedural factors), and (b) witness behavior that may signal that the 
identification was the product of suggestion rather than memory (witness 
factors).”  SB 33.  The State provides no citation to authority in law or science 
explaining why this division is useful.  SB 33.  It is not a useful distinction.  The 
State argues that blatantly suggestive circumstances can be counterbalanced by 
“[w]itness confidence,” a “quick positive identification,” and testimony that the 
eyewitness “identified Defendant because of his looks.”  SB 35-36.1  But “the 
accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with 
which it is made.”  State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986); see also 
Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 451, 453 
                                                          
1 The State argues that the eyewitness explained “that he identified Defendant 
because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the identification took 
place.”  SB 36 (citing R:357:49-50, 94-65, 106-07).  The eyewitness testified that 
the identification was based on looks, but was not asked and did not address how 
the suggestive setting affected him.   
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(2012) (“eyewitness confidence[] is not a sign of reliability, but it is highly 
malleable and may be the product of police suggestion”).  “Social science research 
has shown that a witness’s level of confidence in an identification is not a reliable 
predictor of its accuracy especially where the level of confidence is inflated by its 
suggestiveness.”  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 45 N.E.3d 83, 90 (Mass. 2016) 
(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Supreme Judicial 
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence: Report and Recommendations to 
the Justices 19 (July 25, 2013)).  “In short, suggestiveness is likely to inflate an 
eyewitness’s certainty regarding an identification and to alter the eyewitness’s 
memory regarding the quality of his or her observation of the offender to conform 
to the eyewitness’s inflated level of confidence in the identification.”  Id. at 91.  
“[T]he problem with eyewitness testimony is that the witnesses who think they 
are identifying the wrongdoer — who are credible because they believe every 
word they utter on the stand — may be mistaken.”  United States v. Bartlett, 567 
F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, 
Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (3d ed.1997) (collecting studies); 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979; rev. ed.1996); Daniel L. 
Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers 
112-37 (2001)).   
This effect is on display in this case.  The officer testified that the witness 
did not provide hair color or mention a goatee.  R:359:12; R:355:50 (his report 
indicated the witness “described the suspect as being a Hispanic male wearing a 
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black jacket and black hat with long hair”).  The witness testified, when asked if 
he mentioned a goatee to the officer, “I think I did.”  R:357:87.  Because blatantly 
suggestive circumstances yield quick, confident, but unreliable identifications, 
this Court should decline the State’s invitation to separate the dye from the water 
in the analysis of suggestiveness.    
E. The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.  
 
“This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.”  Long, 721 P.2d at 493.  “[T]he 
evidence concerning the reliability of [cross-racial] identification is stunning and 
robust and, of crucial importance here, not likely well understood by juries.”  
United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (M.D. Ala. 2009).  As 
explained above, the stressful nature of the event diminishes the likelihood that 
the witness was able to perceive and remember the robber.   
The eyewitness described his own race as Native American and described 
the robber as Spanish.  R:355:34.  As the court of appeals noted, in Ramirez, this 
Court was “concerned with the ‘differences in racial characteristics between’ the 
eyewitness and Ramirez.  The Court determined, however, that because the 
identification was based principally on the eyes, physical size, and clothing, these 
racial factors may have been of relatively little importance.”  Lujan, 2015 UT App 
199, ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Mr. 
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Lujan’s case, however, where the eyewitness caught a brief, close-up of the 
robber’s face “‘racial factors’ are more significant here than they were in 
Ramirez.”  Id. ¶ 13.  The State argues that a number of the eyewitness’s neighbors 
“were Hispanic, including those on either side and across the street, giving him 
an easy familiarity with their features.”  SB 47.  However, the witness’s 
description of the robber as Spanish, not Hispanic, either belies such easy 
familiarity or suggests that the robber was from Spain, not Latin America.  
R:355:34.  Additionally, studies have found that “cross-race contact . . . played 
only a small role in [cross-race identification], accounting for just 2% of the 
variability across participants.”  Wells, Memon, & Penrod, supra, at 52.  Duration 
of viewing exposure, on the other hand, can interact with own-race bias.  
National Research Council of the National Academies, supra, at 96.  “[R]educing 
the amount of time allowed for viewing of each face significantly increased the 
magnitude of the bias, largely manifested as an increase in the proportion of false 
alarm responses to other-race faces.”  Id. (citing Christian A. Meissner & John C. 
Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces 
— A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 3 (2001)).  The eyewitness 
in Mr. Lujan’s case spent only five to seven seconds face-to-face with the robber.  
R:355:20.  In Ramirez the witness’s estimate of time varied from a second to “‘a 
minute’ or longer.’”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.  The court of appeals was 
therefore correct that the racial factors had more influence in this case than 
Ramirez.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 13.   
 
 
21 
 
The court of appeals wrote that if “Ramirez was an extremely close call, we 
are confident that here we can say that the man’s testimony is legally insufficient 
when considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary 
finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility.”  Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The totality of the circumstances suggested that the eyewitness 
identification from the show-up was unreliable and should not have been 
admitted.  The eyewitness provided a description of a man he saw during a high-
stress robbery for a matter of several seconds.  The pre-show-up description 
differed from Mr. Lujan significantly because Mr. Lujan had a goatee and did not 
have any hair, let alone the mid-ear length hair the suspect remembered.  
R:355:26; 359:12.  The eyewitness did not provide the “salt and pepper” 
description until after the show-up.  R:359:12.  When asked to identify the 
robber, even after the show-up, in a lineup with eight men, the eyewitness did not 
positively identify Mr. Lujan.  State’s Ex. 42.  The in-court identification was 
tainted both by the earlier show-up and by the suggestive circumstances of a 
courtroom identification.  See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (“unnecessarily suggestive” identification procedures give rise to “the 
possibility of irreparable misidentification”).  Mr. Lujan was the only defendant 
sitting at counsel table and the only realistic choice.  Under these circumstances, 
the court of appeals was correct that due process required the exclusion of the 
suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification.   
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II. This Court should not rearrange the analysis set forth in 
precedent. 
 
The State concedes that “the showup identification of Defendant in this 
case was suggestive.”  SB 32-33.  The show-up procedure the police employed 
was virtually identical to the one this Court criticized for its “blatant 
suggestiveness” in 1991.  State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991).  As in 
Ramirez, Mr. Lujan “‘was the only person at the showup who was not a police 
officer,’ he ‘stood with his hands cuffed,’ and the ‘headlights of several police cars 
were trained on him.’”  State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 12, 357 P.3d 20 
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784)).  This case therefore is not like Perry v. New 
Hampshire, where the identification occurred “spontaneously,” “without any 
inducement from the police,” when the eyewitness “pointed to her kitchen 
window and said the person . . . was standing in the parking lot,” and the Court 
was thus squarely presented with the issue of whether suggestive police activity is 
a threshold inquiry.  132 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 Both sides agree that this Court must consider all the reliability factors 
Ramirez outlined.  This case does not present the issue of whether the 
suggestiveness of the identification is a threshold inquiry or a factor to be 
considered in an overall reliability analysis.  And this Court has “unequivocally 
declared that ‘courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or 
rendering advisory opinions.’”  Utah Transit Authority v. Local 382 of 
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Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19, 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Baird v. 
State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978)).  There is no reason to rearrange the 
reliability analysis at the State’s request in a case where rearrangement would 
serve no practical function.  Whether the due process concerns relating to 
eyewitness identification should focus on suggestiveness or general reliability is a 
serious, contested issue.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the holding “recasts the driving force of our decisions as an interest 
in police deterrence, rather than reliability.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
45N.E. 3d 594, 598 (Mass. 2016) (“where a witness’s identification of a defendant 
arises from highly or especially suggestive circumstances, its admissibility should 
not turn on whether government agents had a hand in causing the confrontation 
because the evidence would be equally unreliable in each instance.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steve D. 
Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in 
the Pub. Int. 45, 46 (2006) (“But even if the system reaches a point at which it 
makes perfect use of system variables, eyewitness errors attributable to other 
factors will remain.”).  This Court should not make a decision that reconsiders 
precedent until the facts of the case, not one of the parties, demands it.      
Furthermore, the State’s argument that suggestive police conduct was 
always a threshold inquiry in Utah is new to its brief on certiorari.  It was not 
argued in the State’s trial court response to the motion to suppress.  R:121-26 
(setting forth the “five reliability factors” and addressing them in that order).  The 
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State presented its argument to the court of appeals as a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  It argued that “[u]nder the Utah Constitution, the 
ultimate question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was sufficiently reliable even though the identification employed by 
police may have been suggestive.”  Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 21.  The State listed 
the Long considerations, which place “whether the witness’s identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion” as the fourth of five factors.  Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 15.  
And the State addressed the factors in that order.  Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 29 
(addressing suggestiveness as point four).  The State now argues that “the court 
of appeals applied a state due process model not contemplated by Ramirez,” SB 
27, but the State presented that model in its brief to the court of appeals.     
The State argues that addressing the issue now would “prevent further 
confusion about and misapplication of the state due process analysis.”  SB 29.  
But providing guidance in this case, where the holding would not depend on that 
guidance, would create more confusion.  State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶¶ 25-
26, 48 P.3d 953, held that the “standard for determining whether defendant’s 
right to due process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
was denied is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identifications 
were reliable.”  Hubbard held that the photo array in that case was “not 
impermissibly suggestive” but its analysis did not end there because “[e]ven if law 
enforcement procedures are appropriate and do not violate due process, 
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eyewitness identification testimony must still pass the gatekeeping function of 
the trial court and be subject to a preliminary determination whether the 
identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury.”  Id. ¶ 26 (citing 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-79).  Addressing the issue in this case, therefore, would 
create an interesting but unnecessary dilemma for lawyers, judges, law 
enforcement, and the general public.  They would be left to wonder whether 
language in this case addressing an issue that is not necessary to the holding 
overrules Hubbard.  This Court should avoid that confusion by waiting for a true 
opportunity to address the dispute head-on. 
However, if this Court does choose to address the question of whether 
suggestive government conduct is a threshold inquiry, it should clarify that it is 
not.  Rather, as recognized in the State’s earlier analysis in this case, the ultimate 
inquiry is reliability, and suggestive circumstances are an important but not the 
threshold consideration in the analysis.    Ramirez made a conscious departure 
from the federal model: “We therefore hold that for purposes of determining the 
due process reliability of eyewitness identifications under article I, section 7, we 
will not limit ourselves to an analytical model that merely copies the federal.  We 
will require an in-depth appraisal of the identification’s reliability along the lines 
laid out by Long.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780.  The approach is “more 
appropriate” and will “meet or exceed in rigor the federal standard.”  Id. at 780-
81.   
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When Ramirez said that its “approach departs from federal case law only 
to the degree we find the federal analytical model scientifically unsupported,” it 
did so in the context of explaining that an identification deemed admissible 
under the Utah standard would necessarily also be admissible under the federal 
analysis.  Id. at 780.  “Since this approach departs from federal case law only to 
the degree that we find the federal analytical model scientifically unsupported, we 
have no doubt that the more empirically based approach of Long will allow a 
court to consider fully ‘the totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the 
identification, as required by Biggers and its progeny, or that the resulting 
reliability determination will meet or exceed in rigor the federal standard as 
expressed in Biggers and Stovall.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
“because [the Court] found article I, section 7 [of the Utah Constitution] satisfied, 
[there was] no need to perform a separate Biggers federal analysis.”  Id. at 784.   
That Ramirez lists suggestiveness as the fourth of five factors, and 
addresses it “[f]inally,” plainly indicates that suggestiveness is not a threshold 
inquiry.  Id. at 784.  Additionally, Ramirez compared the reliability inquiry in 
eyewitness cases to scientific evidence, where no government misconduct is 
required.  817 P.2d at 778-79 (“discussing need for threshold reliability 
examination by trial court prior to admission of scientific evidence, even though 
jury will ultimately determine weight”).  It focused on the important gatekeeping 
function of the trial court and noted that the “danger of . . . an abdication of 
responsibility is particularly serious where the admission of an eyewitness 
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identification is concerned because of the probability that such evidence even 
though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a jury.”  Id. at 779. 
Later, Hubbard set out the two separate due process approaches based on 
the defendant’s two separate challenges.  2002 UT 45.  Hubbard begins with the 
federal “two-part test.”  Id. ¶ 23.  Under the federal analysis, the Court held that 
the “pretrial identification procedures . . . were not impermissibly suggestive” and 
thus “federal due process was not violated.”  Id. ¶ 24.  “As a result,” the Court did 
not need to “address whether the subsequent in-court identifications were 
sufficiently based on untainted, independent foundations to be reliable.”  Id.   
The Court could not use the same analytical model to handle the Utah due 
process challenge, however.  “Utah courts examine the procedural actions taken 
by law enforcement officials in assembling and presenting a photo array to 
witnesses for due process, and Utah courts also make a preliminary 
determination on whether the identification is sufficiently reliable such that its 
admission and consideration by the jury will not violate defendant’s right to due 
process.”  Id. ¶ 25.  This is because in Utah, “[e]ven if law enforcement 
procedures are appropriate and do not violate due process, eyewitness 
identification must still pass the gatekeeping function of the trial court and be 
subject to a preliminary determination whether the identification is sufficiently 
reliable to be presented to the jury.”  Id. ¶ 26.  The Court therefore proceeded to 
analyze the Long factors and concluded that under the facts of that case, “the 
 
 
28 
 
witness identifications were not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion of the 
identification testimony from consideration by the jury.”  Id. ¶¶ 27-30.   
In Ramirez and Hubbard, this Court set out an analytical model more like 
the one explained by the dissent than the majority in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S. Ct. at 730 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  It was the dissent’s position that the 
“driving force” of the due process line of eyewitness cases was “reliability,” not 
“police deterrence.”  Id. at 731.  The dissent explained that although “[p]olice 
machinations can heighten the likelihood of misidentification, . . . they are no 
prerequisite to finding a confrontation ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give risk 
to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.’”  Id. at 733 n.3.  The dissent 
noted that a “vast body of scientific literature has reinforced every concern . . . 
articulated” in the case law regarding the reliability and thus admissibility of 
eyewitness identification.  Id. at 738; see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 n.1.  
The “focus[] on overall reliability,” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735, stressed by the dissent 
echoes Ramirez’s holding that the “ultimate question to be determined is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.”  
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.   
Utah courts consistently use the Ramirez analytical model, focusing on the 
overall reliability of the eyewitness identification.  State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 
45, 993 P.2d 837 (Addressing all factors although the identification “was not the 
product of suggestion”); State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 26, 336 P.3d 46 
(“To evaluate admissibility of an eyewitness identification, we examine the 
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‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether ‘the eyewitness testimony is 
sufficiently reliable so as not to offend a defendant’s right to due process.” 
(alterations omitted)); State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, ¶ 50, 322 P.3d 761 
(applying the Ramirez factors to determine that “[u]nder the totality of the 
circumstances” the identifications “were sufficiently reliable for admission at 
trial”); State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that 
an identification met “all of the Ramirez reliability factors”).  The State’s request 
that this Court “clarify” Ramirez is actually a request that this Court overrule it 
without meeting the “substantial burden” of proving that the precedent is neither 
persuasive and nor firmly established.  See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-
99 (Utah 1994); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 553 (“Because 
stare decisis is so important to the predictability and fairness of a common law 
system, we do not overrule our precedents lightly.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
Although Ramirez labeled its test as “more stringent than[] the federal 
analysis,” the case law does not suggest that the framework has led to the 
exclusion of many eyewitness identifications.  In fact, in the twenty-five years 
since Ramirez, counsel is aware of no other Utah appellate case declaring an 
eyewitness identification inadmissible.  Cf. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (“The vast majority of eyewitnesses proceed to testify before a jury.  
To date, Foster is the only case in which [the United State Supreme Court has] 
found a due process violation.”).  Despite this Court’s criticism of the suggestive 
 
 
30 
 
show-up procedure the police employed in Ramirez, the identification was 
admissible in that case and the police employed the same suggestive show-up 
procedure in this case.  When the majority and the dissent agreed in Lujan that 
“the time may have arrived for the Utah Supreme Court to revisit its holding in 
State v. Ramirez,” it was the admissibility of unreliable identifications like the 
one deemed admissible in Ramirez and the continuing use of unnecessarily 
suggestive show-up procedures that concerned them.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, 
¶¶ 21 (Pearce, J., dissenting), 10 n.1 (majority opinion). 
This Court should thus reaffirm that the Utah due process analysis differs 
from the federal analysis because it focuses on overall reliability, using suggestive 
government conduct as a factor in the analysis but not a threshold inquiry, the 
absence of which could prevent the court from fulfilling “its charge as gatekeeper” 
when it comes to powerful but unreliable eyewitness identifications.  See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778.  Utah’s due process analysis allows courts to consider 
subtly but not intentionally suggestive identification procedures, or suggestive 
procedures arranged by non-government parties, in combination with the other 
reliability considerations for a holistic approach that both encourages best 
practices in identification procedures and guards against wrongful convictions.  
See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (“A primary aim of excluding identification evidence 
obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law 
enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first 
place.”); see id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The empirical evidence 
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demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of 
wrongful convictions in this country.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779 (“The danger of such an abdication of [the trial court’s 
gatekeeping] responsibility is particularly serious where the admissibility of an 
eyewitness identification is concerned because of the probability that such 
evidence even though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on the jury.”). 
III. The admission of the eyewitness identification was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The State argues that this Court should apply the harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard in this case without establishing any precedent.  SB 18 
(“The standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction”).  This is a change 
of course, as the State’s petition for certiorari argued that the “issue of whether 
the burden shifts to the State to prove that a preserved state constitutional error 
in admission of eyewitness identification testimony is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a matter of first impression which should be decided by this 
Court.”  Pet. Cert. 18.  And this Court granted the petition to review that question.  
Add. B.   
The court of appeals noted that if “Utah’s approach ‘is certainly as stringent 
as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis,’” as explained in Ramirez, 
then “there is no reason to assume our constitution would impose a different 
[and less stringent] standard of review for those few circumstances where our 
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constitution is violated but the federal constitution is not.”  Lujan, 2015 UT App 
199, ¶ 16 n.2.    
Constitutional errors, including unreliable eyewitness identifications, must 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court has explained that the 
standard harmless error analysis “does not govern errors . . . that are 
constitutional in nature.”  State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995).  
“Where the error in question amounts to a violation of a defendant’s” 
constitutional rights, “its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., 
reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The admission of unreliable eyewitness 
evidence is a violation of constitutional due process.  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780.  
Utah courts must “scrutinize” eyewitness identification testimony for 
“constitutional defects.”  State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  When such defects exist, the State must 
prove they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425. 
Federal circuit courts have applied the harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt test to eyewitness identification admitted in violation of due process.  E.g., 
United States v. Stubblefield, 621 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (6th Cir. 1976).  “[B]efore a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  A violation of due process under the Utah Constitution 
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should be no less serious to this Court than a violation under the United States 
Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court declared that it was its “responsibility to 
protect” federal constitutional rights “by fashioning the necessary rule.”  Id. at 21.  
It is this Court’s responsibility to protect Utah Constitutional rights, and where 
fairness and reliability under due process are concerned, the harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard is appropriate.  The United States Supreme Court 
adopted the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test for certain constitutional 
errors because although “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair 
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,” there are some 
“which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant 
that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.”  Id. at 22-23.   
In State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that an eyewitness identification was admissible under the due 
process clause and that, furthermore, “the trial court’s denial of the motion to 
suppress did not affect defendant’s substantial rights” because there was strong 
evidence of guilt even absent the identification.  Chapman noted the similarity 
between the substantial rights test and the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
test: both tests “emphasize[] an intention not to treat as harmless those 
constitutional errors that ‘affect substantial rights’ of a party.”  Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 24. 
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Nevertheless, the State argues that Ramirez, Nelson, and Clopten applied 
the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result standard.2  Ramirez applied 
that standard to a different error.  The defendant in Ramirez “raise[d] several 
issues on appeal,” first that “the introduction of the eyewitness identification 
violated his right to due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
because the identification was unreliable,” and second that he was 
unconstitutionally stopped without articulable reasonable suspicion.  817 P.2d at 
778.  The Court never addressed what standard of harmlessness applies to the 
eyewitness identification issue because the Court concluded that the eyewitness 
identification was properly admitted.  Id. at 784.   
The Court then addressed the claim that the defendant was illegally 
stopped.  Id. at 785.  This claim presented the Court with a “difficult problem” 
because the “trial judge simply refrained from passing on the issue [when 
defendant raised it] and let the evidence resulting from the stop and seizure go to 
the jury.”  Id. at 787.  The Court held that it was error for the judge to “permit[] 
the evidence of the stop and seizure and the fruits of that stop, including the 
eyewitness identification, in evidence without determining its constitutional 
admissibility.”  Id. at 788.  And it was this failure, not the admission of an 
                                                          
2 The parties, however, ultimately agree that this Court should employ the 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to this case.  SB 50-51 (arguing 
there is “no reason to reach” the issue of the standard for prejudice and 
“assuming application of the federal standard”).  The federal standard is 
appropriate, but the error was harmful under either standard. 
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unconstitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification, that the Court deemed 
harmful under the non-constitutional test.  Id.  Ramirez never held or suggested 
that unconstitutionally admitted eyewitness identification is subject to the same 
harmlessness test. 
Rather, Ramirez suggested that a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard would have applied if the eyewitness testimony was unconstitutionally 
unreliable.  Ramirez held that “[t]he burden of demonstrating the admissibility 
of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution” and the “defendant is then 
entitled to a determination by the court of the evidence’s constitutional 
admissibility.”  Id. at 778.  This language suggests that, when there is an error in 
the process, the prosecution should bear the burden of proving it was 
constitutionally harmless. 
The State cites State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944-45, a court of appeals case 
that also involved the failure to address an issue instead of the admission of 
evidence that violated due process.  At the suppression hearing for the eyewitness 
identification, the trial court in Nelson “did not make findings as required by 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not consider any of the 
circumstances surrounding the identification in light of the Ramirez factors, and 
did not make a preliminary determination of reliability.”  Id. at 943-44 (footnote 
omitted).  Similar to the trial court in Ramirez’s handling of the stop and seizure 
motion, the trial court in Nelson “sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by 
failing to determine the constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness 
 
 
36 
 
identification testimony.”  Id. at 944.  The court of appeals held that the “trial 
court’s failure to make any findings and failure to make any legal determination 
as to the constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness identification was error.”  
Id.  The court determined that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result absent the error and remanded for a new trial instead of asking 
the trial court “to address the admissibility question” and “tempt it to reach a 
post hoc rationalization for admission of this pivotal evidence.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  It never held that admitted eyewitness identification 
evidence was constitutionally unreliable and therefore did not address what the 
test for prejudice would be in such a case.   
Finally, the State cites State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 39, 223 P.3d 1103.  
SB 50.  But the issue in Clopten was not whether it was harmful error to admit 
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification; the issue was “whether 
expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification should be 
presumed admissible when timely requested.”  Id. ¶ 6.  The Court in Clopten 
addressed an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional violation.  Id. ¶¶ 30-38 
(analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification under Utah Rule of Evidence 702).  Clopten held the error was 
harmful and reversed under the standard harmless error analysis and never 
addressed what standard would apply to unreliable eyewitness identification 
admitted in violation of constitutional due process.  Id. ¶¶ 48-49.  
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The court of appeals correctly concluded that the admission of the 
eyewitness identification in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 19.  Without the identification, “the State loses 
its strongest evidence against Defendant.”  Id.  As the prosecution noted in 
closing, “there’s not a whole lot of dispute about what happened.  The dispute lies 
with who did it.”  R:362:8.  Absent the eyewitness’s confident in-court and show-
up identifications, the State did not provide strong evidence of guilt.  In fact, the 
officer who orchestrated the show-up testified that if the eyewitness had not 
identified Mr. Lujan as the robber, “we would know that he was not our suspect 
and we would know that we need to continue our search.”  R:359:31.  The 
eyewitness described a robber with long hair and an open leather jacket.  
R:357:85 (testifying that he could “definitely see hair sticking out of the sides of 
the hat”), 83-84 (describing a leather jacket that “definitely” opened in the front).  
Mr. Lujan had a goatee, closely shaved hair, and the evidence indicated he had no 
jacket.  R:357:59, 62-69, 75, 137. The State makes much of the officers’ testimony 
that they also remembered a jacket.  SB 12, 37, 42-43, 51.  But the officer who 
testified about clothing storage at the jail was not aware of items ever being 
misplaced.  R:359:62-69, 75.  The jury might then question whether the officers’ 
memories were influenced by the witness’s description.  And the loss or 
destruction of evidence would only further damage the State’s case. 
Even after the show-up, the eyewitness was not able to positively identify 
Mr. Lujan at a lineup; he could indicate only that he thought he recognized Mr. 
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Lujan and another man.  State’s Ex. 42.  Furthermore, Mr. Lujan’s statements to 
the police denied involvement in the robbery.  R:359:8, 32.  The police did not 
recover fingerprints from the inside of the vehicle, and did not attempt to dust 
the outside or collect DNA evidence.  R:359:7.    
And, although Mr. Lujan was found relatively near the abandoned vehicle 
and a K9 officer was employed, the officer who found Mr. Lujan described his 
inclination to go towards the air conditioning unit as a “gut feeling” based on a 
rustling noise after he had “split up” with the K9 officer.  R:359:17-18.  The officer 
testified that the dog began to pull the handler hard when the officers reached the 
walkway gate of the school, which was an indication that the dog had “picked up 
on a track of the person that they are looking for.”  R:357:128.  The State 
describes the dog’s “discernment of a lone scent,” SB 51-52, but the State cites no 
record source for this assertion and the K9 handler did not testify.  The dog 
pulled the officers through the walkway gate.  R:357:128.  Afterwards, the dog 
“pull[ed] . . . toward some portable or relocatable classrooms.”  R:357:128-29.  
But at that point the officer and the K-9 handler “kind of split our efforts so that 
[they] wouldn’t be ambushed from behind.”  R:357:129. 
When the officer had the gut feeling, he did not “alert the canine handler 
because [he] didn’t want to give [his] position away.”  R:357:130.  The dog did not 
return until the officer “had a weapon out and pointed” and was giving 
commands to Mr. Lujan.  R:359:28.  The officer’s “commands seemed to prompt 
the K-9 officer to come over to [his] location.”  R:359:28.  The court of appeals 


